We map changes in the transmission of unobservable structural shocks between US financial asset markets during the 2007-2009 crisis. By developing a new Smooth Transition Structural GARCH model, we endogenously detect simultaneous structural shifts in the relationships between three asset classes, which themselves may be endogenously determined. We apply our model to investigate breaks in the relationships between S&P500, Treasury bonds, and REITS over 7 June 2001 -16 September 2010. Several breaks are detected, all of which are dated to be within the subprime crisis time frame. There are significant changes in the links between S&P500 and REIT returns, but the links with T-bonds become insignificant in the first phase of the crisis and remain so through the second phase and recovery.
Introduction
Real estate shocks precipitated the 2007-2009 financial crisis but other financial asset markets, including equity and debt markets, received, transmitted and possibly amplified those shocks.
The US recession that followed on the subprime crisis, was caused primarily by a failure of investment, broadly defined (Hall 2010) . In core economic models, declines in investment are ameliorated by falling interest rates, with reductions in official rates often acting as catalyst.
One characteristic of the recent crisis, however, was that official interest rate reductions did not induce lower market lending rates in key sectors, including corporate bonds and consumer credit, where spreads widened and rates rose. Hall attributes rising spreads to financial frictions, especially increased uncertainty over the quality of collateral and the likelihood of defaults, and the 'zero lower bound' on official rates. Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (2010) observe that asset fire sales encouraged banks to hold onto distressed assets rather than fund efficient new projects.
In this paper we dissect the crisis at the level of structural shocks, measuring contagion by tracking changes in linkages between Treasury bonds, equities and real estate investment trust (REIT) returns. In section 2 below, we use the Structural GARCH method of Dungey et al. (2010) to identify and label innovations from each of these security markets and to estimate contemporaneous market linkages as a simultaneous linear system with independent GARCH(1,1) errors. The model relies on identification via heteroskedasticity. Contagion shows up as significant changes in contemporaneous linkage coefficients from pre-crisis to crisis periods.
Variance decompositions track the dynamics of the estimated system, illustrating changes in the sources and sizes of shocks.
We extend the Dungey et al. (2010) set up with smooth transition functions to endogenously detect shifts in the structural system. The smooth transition technology offers a tractable method to capture non-linearities in time series (See, among others, Granger 1993; van Dijk et al. 2002; and Silvennoinen and Terasvirta 2010) and is well suited to crisis dating and modelling. Smooth transition models use logistic functions of time to create convex combinations of structural parameters at different crisis phases. As time passes through a series of (estimated) threshold values, the matrix of structural linkages is allowed to shift between a series of regimes.
These shifts can be slow or sudden, depending on the slope of the transition function.
In the results set out in section 3 we address several key questions relating to financial contagion and the effectiveness of reductions in official rates as proxied by returns to a Treasury bond index: Are REIT or equity shocks amplified or dampened in the different markets over the crisis? Are there significant changes in the transmission of Treasury bond shocks to and from equity and REIT markets at each crisis phase? Have linkages in the post-crisis phase returned to pre-crisis levels?
Large and significant changes in the impact of equity shocks on REITS, begin in mid-2007 and persist into the post-crisis phase in [2009] [2010] . On the other hand, what were significant two-way channels between T-bonds, REITS and equities in the pre-crisis period, become insignificant at the beginning of the first crisis phase, and remain so into the recovery, especially for equities. These results suggest that typical transmissions between government debt markets and other asset markets became confused during the subprime crisis. From the perspective of policy-makers, a breakdown in this conventional transmission channel may motivate the use of additional instruments to temper markets.
Further, we map the dynamics of structural shocks on asset volatility using forecast error variance decompositions. Decomposition dynamics depend on both the relative size of stock, bond and REITS shocks and on changes in contemporaneous linkages. While REIT-sourced shocks began to grow before the crisis, from early 2004, changes in linkages during the crisis phases actually reduced the dominance of REITs in favor of equity shocks. When we hold precrisis linkages constant but allow the volatility dynamics to vary through the crisis, the relative importance of REIT shocks is much larger in variance decompositions for all three assets and for an equally-weighted portfolio. When linkages are allowed to vary, we find that, both early and late in the sample, turbulence from the S&P500 is most important.
Most existing studies of the crisis choose phase dates exogenously on the basis of arbitrarily selected major events. Mishkin (2011) A clear outcome from the modelling is that conditions in 2009-10 are not what they were early in the decade. The contemporaneous connection between bond and stock markets have not returned to pre-crisis conditions and estimated linkage parameters between indices for these assets are insignificantly different from zero. After a period of confusion during the crisis, the parameter linking REITs to T-bonds has changed sign from positive to negative and impact of T-bonds on REITs has become insignificant and also changed sign. On the other hand, the impact of REITs on stocks is significantly weaker than the pre-crisis period, while the impact of stocks on REITs is almost ten times larger.
Overall, we observe significant alteration in the linkages between the government debt markets, real estate and equity markets that persists into the current period and is most likely driven by the fact that changes in sovereign debt yields did not transmit into lower consumer and business credit rates. The switch in dominance from REIT to equity shocks is likely to be the outcome of investors and institutions reducing exposure to mortgage securities and a stronger focus on the non-real-estate sectors of the US economy in evaluating the prospects for recovery.
In section 4 we conclude and explore possibilities for further work.
Model
We model asset returns via contemporaneous structural linkages and GARCH shocks. Define a vector of k filtered asset returns Y t , with contemporaneous interdependence described by the system:
where B is a k × k matrix of coefficients, b ij , with diagonal elements b ii normalized to one. 1
Vector u t , are uncorrelated scaled structural innovations
where g t is a k × k diagonal matrix and e t is a k × 1 vector of i.i.d. standard normal shocks.
See Dungey et al. (2010) for details of the model dynamics.
Transition model
The model in (1) and (2) The time varying linkages are:
and we allow B t to be a convex combination of up to four invertible contiguous matrices of linkages B 0 , B 1 , B 2 and B 3 , where combinations depend on 3 logistic transition functions of time (here time, indexed as j = 1, 2, 3),
Define x t = t/T as the time transition variable, and c j as the location of the transition between the four phases, where 0 < c 1 < c 2 < c 3 < x T for the sample t = 0, 1, . . . , T . If the transition speed γ is high, the model 'jumps' between regimes. In the pre-crisis period, for example, while values of x t remain below the first time threshold c 1 , the realized value of the transition functions S j all approach zero and B t is made up entirely of the matrix of pre-crisis linkages, B 0 . As x t approaches c 1 , the realized value of the transition function S 1 rapidly approaches one, while S 2 and S 3 are still zero, and B t switches to B 1 . The fourth phase of the crisis begins when x t = c 3 and linkages are described only by B 3 .
The advantage of the smooth transition model over a regime switching model is that the transition function is continuous and differentiable at values of γ < ∞, and for a fixed value of γ, the likelihood is a smooth function of parameters. When standard regularity conditions hold, and specifically when there are a known number of crisis phases, the maximum likelihood estimator will be asymptotically normal and inference about c j is straightforward. We allow for four regimes B t over the sample and search for the three values of c j that capture the best break points in the joint structure fitting the model in (4). We discuss the estimation process in more detail below.
Structural GARCH
We use a structural GARCH model to identify contemporaneous linkages and also model the time-varying volatility of financial asset returns in Y t . Given the structure of (2) we can write distribution of scaled structural innovation u t as
where G t = g t g t is a k × k diagonal matrix of the squares of the elements of the matrix g t .
The conditional covariance matrix of the structural shocks is a GARCH(1,1)
where Ψ, λ and ζ are k × k diagonal matrices. The typical element in G t is,
When
Since our focus is on market contagion and the conditional variances of individual structural shocks are already time varying, the GARCH parameters (Ψ, λ, ζ) of the structural shocks are assumed to be constant.
Both G t−1 and u t−1 are unobservable, so we specify the system as a reduced form,
The joint conditional distribution of the vector of filtered returns is
and we work with this reduced form covariance matrix, H t , which can be estimated as a multivariate GARCH process in the filtered returns vector
Identification of structural parameters
Milunovich and Yang (2010) show that, for a k-dimensional VAR where at least k − 1 structural shocks have ARCH effects, all the structural parameters are locally identifiable. We formalize this argument in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If (i) γ is sufficiently large; (ii) at least k − 1 structural shocks have ARCH effects; (iii) (B 0 , B 1 , B 2 , B 3 ) are all invertible and different; (iv) 0 < c 1 < c 2 < c 3 , then the structural parameters are locally identifiable at any regular point in the parameter space.
Proof. The reduced form model may be written as y t = B −1 t u t and y t |I t−1 ∼ (0, H t ), where
. Under (i), in Phase i(i = 0, 1, 2, 3), the effect on H t of B j for any j = i is virtually zero. Hence, for each i, B i and structural parameters other than B j with j = i and (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) are locally identified in Phase i when (ii) and (iii) hold (Milunovich and Yang 2011 ).
Hence we only need to establish that the phases are identifiable. We note that there are only two possible cases to lose identification of the phases: (a) two or more of (B 0 , B 1 , B 2 , B 3 ) are identical; (b) two or more of (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) are identical. But these two cases are ruled out by (iii) and (iv). In other words, because the parameters are at a regular point of the parameter space, where the rank of the Jacobian from structural parameters to reduced-form parameters does not change locally, (iii) and (iv) imply that any local changes in (B 0 , B 1 , B 2 , B 3 ) and (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 )
have non-negligible effects on H t . Therefore the proposition holds under the stated conditions.
The mapping between structural and reduced form parameters proceeds as follows. We re-write (7) as,
where
is a 1 × k vector with only one non-zero element l i at the i th position. Given (1) and (2) suggest the reduced-form shocks follow the GARCH formulation
where C 1 and C 3 are k × k with C 1 being lower triangular. Here
is k × k 2 block diagonal, and C 2,i are 1 × k vectors. Clearly, H t here is always semi-positive definite and is positive definite when C 1 is of full rank.
Given the relationship between the reduced and structural variance equations
and (I k ⊗ B t )(I k ⊗ u t−1 ), Milunovich and Yang show that the mapping from the structural to the reduced form parameters is given by
and we see that
where there are k 2 +2k parameters in (B, Ψ, λ, ζ) and
Estimation is in one step, by quasi maximum likelihood in OX and code is available from the authors on request.
Identification, restrictions and estimation
The requirement for identifying the regimes is that the parameters (including B t and GARCH parameters) for each regime are distinct in such a way that one regime cannot be observationally equivalent to another regime. Identification of (1) has been proven under the conditions in Milunovich and Yang (2010) : if all regimes are identified, then all B j matrices are identified.
We pre-tested a general model that allowed the slope parameter of the transition functions, γ j to take any value less than infinity. The estimated values of γ j exceeded 10,000, so that transitions between phases approached jumps. For efficiency in the final estimation below,
we set the value of γ to 100,000 and estimated the remaining coefficients. The final model, incorporating phases of the 2007-2009 financial crisis is:
where the detailed structure of equation (13) is y 1,t = b 12,j y 2,t + b 13,j y 3,t + u 1,t y 2,t = b 21,j y 1,t + b 23,j y 3,t + u 2,t y 3,t = b 31,j y 1,t + b 32,j y 2,t + u 3,t such that j = 0 when x t < c 1 , j = 1 when c 1 ≤ x t < c 2 , j = 2 when c 2 ≤ x t < c 3 and j = 3 otherwise.
Dynamics
The SGARCH structure creates an alternative approach to identifying and interpreting shocks which avoids arbitrary restrictions such as Choleski decomposition or long-run variance assumptions. Following Dungey et al. (2010) , we connect each structural shock to a source market using variance decompositions. Since the whole normalized structural model is identified, we can isolate the structural innovations by estimation and then use the variance decompositions to give an interpretation of source. We treat the shocks which contribute the largest part of each market forecast error variance during the pre-crisis period as emanating from that market.
Variance decompositions using 2nd-4th phase estimates expose the changes in the size and sign of transmission patterns from stock, bond and REIT market shocks during and after the crisis. Isolating the main source of structural turbulence in this way allows ex post evaluation of the relative effectiveness of policy interventions designed to calm specific markets. Ex ante, the model could be used to guide interventions towards markets generating the largest share of volatility.
The 1-step ahead conditional forecast error variance for Y t is the fitted value of the reduced form conditional covariance matrix:
treating all estimated parameter values as known with certainty. Since structural parameters are identified in estimation (G
, this reduced form gives a variance decomposition that can be assigned to structural shocks, where the percentage of the forecast error variance at time t for asset return y i that is due to each structural shock e j is
and where g j,t+1|t is the jth column of the 1-period ahead forecast standard deviation matrix g t+1|t . In the results reported below, we link the structural shock e j to the market i if
is the largest of all j, which gives a unique labeling in this application.
We can also use forecast error variance decomposition to track the dynamics of changes in portfolio risk due to exposure to a particular asset class. If an investors hold an equally-weighted portfolio across the k assets throughout the crisis, the proportion of portfolio volatility associated with each structural shock is
where ω is a k × 1 vector of portfolio weights, here, 1/k.
Results

Model fit
We estimate this model using filtered ( Table 6 (Appendix) and support a well-fitting model overall. While the Hinich (1982) and Jarque-Bera (1980 , 1987 tests reject the null of normality, the Lung-Box Q, Tsay (1986) and Hinich (1982) bispectral tests for no autocorrelation and linearity in means are not rejected at the 1% level for any e i . 3 Source: Authors calculations. Figure shows standardized structural shocks ei i = 1, 2, 3 at each observation.
Dating
The logistic transition functions S j depend on x t = t/T and thresholds c j at which the model switches from linkage matrix B j−1 to B j . The thresholds are estimated as increments of time, where c j = c j−1 + ∆c j so that at each step we can test the hypothesis that ∆c j = 0. Estimated values of c j , conditioning on the restrictions of four phases and γ = 100, 000, are statistically and June 2009. Here we identify three significant break points endogenously, subject to the restriction that the breaks occur at the same date for all three filtered returns series.
We estimate the pre-crisis phase as running from the beginning of the sample to late September -early (1 
Asset market linkages
The estimated linkages between equities, bonds and REITs in the pre-crisis phase make a base for comparing changes during the crisis. Results from Table 2 show that all market linkages in the pre-crisis period are significant. Reading across the first row, we see that positive stock returns tend to decrease T-bond index returns, possibly via growth or inflation expectations tilting the yield curve upwards. Higher bond returns (associated with lower yields) raise stock returns, as expected.
By contrast, the relationship between bonds and REITs during the pre-crisis period is puzzling: we expect to see higher bond returns (lower yields) stimulating the housing sector and impacting positively on REIT returns but the estimated coefficient is negative. We estimate that higher stock returns raise REITs returns and vice versa in the pre-crisis phase, with the impact of REITs on stocks exceeding the impact of stocks on REITs. As well as the direct effect of housing construction on expected cash flows, and hence on the value of equities, the high impact of real estate returns on stocks may have been caused by strong growth in household consumption funded by leveraging housing equity, which amplified the links between the real economy and housing prices. Mian and Sufi (2010) not rule out these sequential effects (we work with pre-filtered returns) but also offers evidence for further contemporaneous contagion that could be caused both by correlated information and concurrent, rather than sequential, liquidity constraints or risk-premium changes.
As noted above, we could attribute the breakdown in links between sovereign debt returns and other asset markets to a number of causes including persistently high spreads in credit and corporate bond markets. As official rates fell, financial frictions, illiquidity and uncertainty over the value of collateral held up commercial interest rates and dampened the stimulating impact of monetary policy, which quickly reached the zero bound (Hall 2010) . Further, financial institutions holding distressed assets at dislocated prices had incentives to avoid realizing losses, and to use capital to support portfolios of distressed assets in expectation of very high returns rather than to make capital available to fund economically productive, but lower yielding, projects (Shleifer and Vishny 2010) .
In addition, 'flight-to-quality' supported a long positive trend in sovereign debt prices during the crisis, at odds with normal correlation patterns with equity and real estate prices. Figure 3 graphs the levels of the T-bond, S&P500 and REIT indices over the sample. When the equity and (based on options on T-bonds) (Grabowski, 2010) . These data indicate both unusually strong price increases and uncertainty about their sustainability, consistent with flight-to-quality. 4
Empirical analysis of spreads backs up these arguments. Guidolin and Tam (2010) find that during the crisis, yield spreads stopped being mean reverting, detaching from normal attractor or 'benchmark' levels which themselves rose dramatically. They attribute this to a failure of the less-risky bond (at the base of the spread) to react to rises in the yields of more risky instruments, consistent both with policy responses aiming to promote liquidity and with flight-to-quality.
Unlike the sequential contagion effects exposed by Longstaff (2010) which dissipated over 2008, the pattern of contemporaneous linkages we identify continues into the second crisis phase, with strong and significant contagious transmission between stock and REIT returns but insignificant estimates of the transmissions to and from bond markets. Results during the crisis recovery indicate that pre-crisis patterns are not restored. All Wald tests for parameter equality between the pre-and post-crisis phases reject the null hypothesis.
We still observe stronger linkages between stock and REIT innovations than during the pre-crisis phase, and also the same insignificance for connections between the Treasury bond and stock market innovations, however Bond and REIT connections are significant at the 10% level. The coefficient on REIT innovations in the stock equation is much less than the pre-crisis estimate, but the coefficient on shocks from stocks to REITs is larger by around one. ing shock e i , so we label them as stock, T-bond and REIT shocks accordingly. In the pre-crisis period, the average percentage of the forecast error variance attributable to the own-market shock is close to 80%. Table 5 reports the average percentage variance due to different sources at each phase of the crisis.
Dynamics of structural shocks
Several interesting feature of the decomposition dynamics can be seen in Source: Authors calculations. Two components of the model determine the dynamics of the variance decompositions. The first is the size and intensity of elements of u t and the second is the changes in B t . To compare the relative importance of these components we compute the variance decompositions through the whole sample while keeping the linkage matrix fixed at B 0 and track the changes in the decomposition through the rest of the sample. The dynamic variance decomposition graphs in Figure 5 show that had contemporaneous linkages stayed as they were in the pre-crisis period, REIT shocks would have been much more dominant through the crisis and up to the end of the sample, and equity market shocks much less. Figure 5 is a visualization of the dynamic modifications to contemporaneous linkages. 
Conclusions
Using an identified structural GARCH model with smooth transitions, we estimate linkages between key US financial markets over four phases of the sub-prime crisis and recovery, using Estimation of the contemporaneous linkages between financial markets prior to the onset of the crisis showed coefficients were significantly different from zero and correlated in conventional ways. However at the onset of the crisis we note that innovations to and from T-bonds to stocks and real estate trusts became insignificant, and in the first stage of the crisis, of unexpected sign. Linkages between REITs and equity innovations became significantly stronger. This pattern persists through the second stage of the crisis and into the recovery period.
Our structural decomposition bears out concerns that the policy of reducing official interest rates to stabilize turbulence and stimulate economic recovery may not be effective in the light of financial frictions, uncertainty, and the 'zero lower bound'. 
